In case you are a Japanese soldier who have been hiding somewhere in the Pacific for sixty years and have missed every single piece of news in the meantime, only to resurface and start reading right here right now, you might be aware that in 2008 there was a massive banking failure as a result of subprime mortgages that allowed the United States government through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to transfer up to $700 billion to banks. About $550 billion has actually been spent. The rules on what the transfer actually bought are somewhat complicated, and not worth repeating here. The important point is that this entire program was necessary because banks were under-capitalized, especially so considering how risky their assets were (that’s a different story altogether). See more on capitalization here, here, and here.
You may be asking why am I making a return to blogging over something so obvious, when there is very little controversial about this? Good question, fake reader!
The reason is that there are forces who don’t think banks should actually be required to hold a higher percentage of money: not surprisingly, these forces are bankers themselves.
Citibank’s CEO Vikram Pandit wants to punish banks for riskiness and ignore capital requirements:
Pandit said that capital rules, such as the international Basel agreements, are not transparent and do not give investors a good idea of how much risk a bank is facing.
Pandit said that under the current capital rules it is difficult to tell whether two banks who claim to be meeting the same standard are “equally risky.”
“You don’t know how to calibrate risk because you don’t know enough about what those underlying assets actually are nor how that risk is measured,” Pandit said Friday to a Bretton Woods Committee meeting in Washington.
Pandit said a better way for making sure the financial system is sound would be to create a benchmark portfolio that banks and other financial institutions would measure their own portfolios against.
He said those results should be disclosed publicly.
The response to this is simple: the conventional wisdom on riskiness can very easily be wrong. People who saw the mortgage meltdown coming were mocked. Ratings agencies famously gave AAA ratings to bundled crap (and breaking today: the SEC may go after them). Even if we put the incompetence to the side, we can’t guarantee that a safe profile is, in fact, safe. Companies that were insulated from the subprime crisis were almost brought down by it – companies are too interlocked nowadays.
Secondly, I don’t think there’s an easy way to just get all banks together and get them to disclose their assets to some third party. Banking is too competitive, and if a bank thinks it has a competitive advantage, it’s going to want to hide that.
A couple weeks further bank, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon tried an even dumber line of reasoning to avoid capital requirements:
“I’m very close to thinking the U.S. shouldn’t be in Basel anymore. I would not have agreed to rules that are blatantly anti-American,” he said in the interview.
“Our regulators should go there and say: ‘If it’s not in the interests of the U.S., we’re not doing it’.”
The Basel III capital rules are designed to increase the safety of the financial system by making banks build up risk-absorbent “core tier one” capital to at least 7 percent of risk-weighted assets. The biggest, including JPMorgan, have to reach 9.5 percent.
This was promptly rejected by European and American regulators. At the time, Matt Yglesias pointed out that 1) Jamie Dimon is not paid to advocate for America, but for the banks, and 2) there is nothing inherently un-American about rules on a bank that happens to be American – the rules are normatively good or bad on their own accord, not because of whom they effect. (Incidentally, the only person I could find agreeing with Dimon also urged the US to default on the debt. Not the most credible voice in the world in my humble opinion.)
But Dimon is not going to give up easily: if there’s a regulator to scream at, he’s game, even if that regulator is Canadian:
The new Basel III agreement—the rules regulators from around the globe agreed to late last year—calls for all banks to hold 7 percent capital, up from 3 percent. The biggest banks would be required to hold an additional 2.5 percent capital.
Dimon’s tirade was directed at Mark Carney, Bank of Canada governor, in a closed-door meeting in front of more than dozens of leading bankers and regulators, the Financial Times reports. According to the FT, things got so heated that Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein sent an apologetic email to Carney afterwards.
That’s right, Dimon is so upset that his bank will have to maintain 7% capital that his anger even puts Goldman Sachs to shame.
There are a number of small issues with the Basel Convention that require general debate. The capitalization requirement is not one of them and it’s embarrassing that American banks are putting up this fight.
Banks are creatures of social utility: a bunch of private citizens give their money to an entity that by definition will spend it on other things but promise that if you need it you can get your money. It’s therefore up to the public (through the government) to set rules regarding such capitalization. Because failures in this market are not entirely rational: bank failures cause runs on all banks. It’s not an overstatement that the entire fabric of society is at risk when banks are at risk – that is why something like TARP was entirely necessary in the first place.
[I’m blatantly stealing a joke from Douglas Adams and re-purposing it as a critique of American media. With no further delay….]
In an interview with a Democratic politician, A Sunday Show said he was told that Republicans claim they didn’t understand how televisions work, and were convinced that there must be lots of little men inside the box, manipulating images at high speed. The Democrat explained to the Sunday Show host about high-frequency modulations of the electromagnetic spectrum, transmitters and receivers, amplifiers and cathode ray tubes, scan lines moving across and down a phosphorescent screen. The host listened to the engineer with careful attention, nodding his head at every step of the argument. At the end he pronounced himself satisfied. He really did now understand how televisions work. “But I expect there are just a few little men in there, aren’t there?”
If you don’t like this, blame me, not Adams…
Andrew Sullivan believes that Ron Paul is needed in the GOP race in order to lead a wave of foreign policy change:
But the point of [Paul’s] candidacy is not necessarily to win, but to open up the foreign policy debate. And when you look at the move of the GOP in the last few years away from big government conservatism to a more Paulite view of the role of the state, I think his importance is under-stated. Most of all, he has integrity, even if you think he’s way off the map ideologically. Very few of his rivals have that kind of character. Some of them seem to have had careers and lives that scream out against it. Palin, Gingrich, Trump, and Romney are all obvious liars, positioners and, to a greater or lesser extent, frauds. I’d put Huntsman, Daniels, Santorum, and Johnson in a group as exceptions to this rule. But Ron Paul heads the pack – in consistency, integrity and sincerity.
Steve Kornacki‘s post at Salon reveals what is obvious: that Paul is only a needed candidacy for political junkies:
The biggest winner may be political junkies, who will probably find the coming GOP presidential debates far more interesting with Paul in them, especially when the subject turns to foreign policy. Paul’s appearance on Sean Hannity’s show last night offered a preview of what we can expect. When the subject turned to America’s relationship with the Muslim world, Paul refused to engage in the kind of Muslim-baiting that has become de rigueur for Republican politicians.
Kornacki also is clear on the limits of Paul’s support:
[T]here’s a clear ceiling on Paul’s support. A passionate, not insignificant chunk of the Republican base is receptive to him and his message. But most of the conservative establishment is openly hostile to him, partly because of his adamantly non-interventionist foreign policy views and partly because he can be so easily painted as a fringe figure. Elite conservative opinion-shapers long ago succeeded in marginalizing Paul within the GOP. This point was driven home at CPAC the past two years. Each time, Paul won the annual presidential straw poll (with well under 50 percent of the vote), setting off jubilant cheers from his supporters — and angry boos from just about everyone else in the room. Recall also that Fox News actually blocked Paul from participating in the final GOP debate before the 2008 GOP primary — even though he had just finished ahead of Rudy Giuliani (and tied with Fred Thompson) in Iowa.
The problem that Sullivan doesn’t even attempt to grasp is that in his rush to embrace Paul’s foreign policy ideas, he’s inadvertantly unleashed Paul’s completely idiotic monetary policies on the world. E.D. Kain addressed this earlier today regarding FGary Johnson:
Probably the best argument against supporting Johnson is this: supporting a candidate based on a single-issue alliance is not as effective as supporting a cause.
It’s also more dangerous because if that cause becomes too embodied by that candidate, then the rest of his ideas – like abolishing the Fed, for instance – can then become conflated with the good cause as well. And so you weaken and undermine those ideas by associating them too closely with the bad ideas of the candidate you supported. You see this with Ron Paul, who has very good and decent positions on foreign intervention and the security state, but who is way off in crazy Austrian land when it comes to economics and goldbuggery.
It’s important to build up support for these ideas from the bottom up rather than from the top down. If you want a more anti-war, civil-liberties-based liberalism than you have to argue for it, work with activists to build up grass-roots support for those policies, and vote for local and state candidates who support those ideas. Making a deal with the devil may be a dramatic and appealing way to register one’s dissent, but it’s more than likely counter-productive. A show of support for Johnson’s anti-drug-war policies is just as easily taken as support for slashing public support for healthcare and education, or for busting public sector unions.
I understand Sullivan’s frustration even if I don’t completely share it. He wants a much, much more limited foreign policy has a large blog and still has had little progress in achieving that goal.
But left unsaid by Sullivan is that Ron Paul ran four years ago. In the years since, despite Paul having record money showered upon him, we’ve seen no indication whatsoever that the core of the GOP was changed by that engagement. If anything, they’re worse than ever given the antipathy towards Muslims that Obama’s Presidency has unwittingly revealed. By contrast, a giant part of the GOP is now out to burn the Federal Reserve to the ground metaphorically. Ron Paul is teaching Michele Bachmann about the Fed, not about the war in Iraq. Someone should notice that at some point.
Paul has no say on foreign policy in this Congress, but he does have a key subcommittee post on monetary policy. I watched Paul on the Colbert Report last night, and Paul spent more time taking on the Federal Reserve than talking about foreign policy.
At some point, it’s time to put away niche candidacies, even if you would like the niche, because there are bigger things at stake. I’d like Andrew Sullivan to admit that Ron Paul has doine more harm to America monetarily than good militarily. Find a more responsible candidate if you need drastic foreign policy change. It’s irresponsible to support Paul for that purpose anymore.
More bluntly, it’s time to stop wishing about what candidate Sullivan wishes Ron Paul was and to start looking at what candidate Ron Paul is.
The Department of Justice decided to not prosecute Thomas Tamm for leaking information regarding secret warrantless wiretapping to the New York Times under the Bush Administration.
This reminded me of what Adam Serwer wrote this morning about Bradley Manning, even mentioning Tamm:
I don’t agree with the equivalence some Manning defenders have drawn between Manning and other leakers. Yesterday, Glenn Greenwald wrote that “Once again we find how much we now rely on whistleblowers in general – and WikiLeaks and (if he did what’s accused) Bradley Manning in particular – to learn the truth and see the evidence about what the world’s most powerful factions are actually doing.” There’s a difference between the kind of targeted leaking whistleblowing involves and simply releasing reams of information, which is what Manning is accused of doing. There’s a difference between what Manning is accused of doing and Thomas Tamm, the FBI agent who exposed an unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping program. There’s a difference between what Daniel Ellsberg did when he exposed years of government lies about Vietnam, even if Ellsberg himself doesn’t see it. A targeted leak meant to expose a specific instance of government malfeasance is qualitatively and morally distinct from someone simply exposing volumes of information without regard for what might be in them, even if some of that information ultimately leads to the disclosure of information related to government misbehavior.
None of this is to say that Wikileaks should be prosecuted, an act that would set a disturbing precedent that could endanger the First Amendment rights of all media organizations. I do however, think if Manning is guilty he should be punished. I don’t mean punished by austere conditions in pre-trial detention, before any level of legal culpability is established, but I do think the government has the authority to go after leakers rather than whistleblowers, and if the accusations against Manning are true he’s the former rather than the latter. Official secrecy should never be used to cover up government malfeasance, but there are some government functions that require secrecy, and those cannot be performed if there is no legal barrier to disclosing that information.
It’s important to get right at what that difference is. The difference is not who it was leaked to – both Wikileaks and the New York Times (in re Tamm and Ellsberg) are media organizations.
The problem is that statutorily sending information to the media is leaking:
Under U.S. law, in simple terms, a “whistleblower” is somebody who reports an employer’s bad conduct to an agency with oversight over the employer. You’re working for a mining company, the mining company is committing safety violations, so you report the violations to the MSHA; or they’re committing environmental violations, so you report the violations to the EPA; or they’re committing wage and hour violations so you complain to the state or federal department of labor. Whistleblower protections come into play, as your employer is not supposed to retaliate against you for reporting their conduct.
Leaking is when you take your employer’s confidential information and you provide it to somebody outside of your organization, usually the media, for the purpose of exposing your employer’s conduct. Leaking is not the same as whistleblowing. Unlike whistleblowing, a statutorily protected activity, leaking is usually going to be tortious and often criminal in nature.
Circumstances arise when the oversight system breaks down or is corrupted, and a frustrated employee leaks information in order to end abuses that won’t otherwise be stopped. There are also times when an employer’s activities are lawful, but the employee is sufficiently offended by those activities or their implications that he chooses to leak them to the media.
Tamm’s and Ellsberg’s targeted leaks were both instances where the oversight system broke down – what they were leaking about concerned the specific concerns of alleged illegal or unconstitutional action that went to the highest office in the land.
That’s just not the case with Manning. He just copied and pasted a whole trove of State Department Secrets and sent it off. Some were embarrassing to the US, some embarrassing to other countries, some might even have been deserving of targeted leaks, depending on circumstances I’m not really aware of. But that wasn’t what Manning did. Burning down a city isn’t justified because a mass murderer perished in the flames.
When Kennedy, who serves on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, ruled in February that Uthman was being improperly detained, his 27-page opinion was turned over to a court security officer for classification review.
The judges themselves have very little insight into the process and no sway over what is redacted. Government security officials review filings in the habeas litigation and other cases involving classified evidence and remove sensitive information.
In the Uthman case, that clearance process took three weeks. Kennedy’s decision was stamped “Redacted,” by the court’s security officer and returned to his chambers on March 16. The deletions were minimal. For the first 16 pages, the only word blacked out was “secret,” stamped at the top and bottom of each page.
Kennedy’s clerk added the document to the electronic court file late in the day. Twenty-five hours later, the security office sent out urgent notices to attorneys and the judge that the opinion had not been ready for release and needed additional deletions. The decision was promptly removed from the public docket.
In a closed hearing in his courtroom four days later, Kennedy lashed out at the government for releasing classified information. He and Justice Department attorneys then argued over what to do, according to three sources familiar with the discussion.
Kennedy insisted that the reasoning behind his first habeas ruling be made public. But the Justice Department resisted releasing it in redacted form, arguing that blacked out portions would call attention to the exact material the government wanted to conceal.
This is an excellent report by Pro Publica (not a surprise, they’re the best around at that). But beyond what Pro Publica reports, we as a society can often be in a rush to make everything a political decision, but sometimes it’s just as simple as a bureaucratic error. While the detention involved presidential decisions, the redaction decisions are of a much lower pay grade. One of them got screwed up, with no easy way to make it right. Regardless of whether detention at Guantanamo or elsewhere was done correctly, poorly, or somewhere in the middle, this situation could still exist.
It’s also hard to jump to conclusions about the impact on the judge when the judge will not say what it was:
Kennedy’s original opinion noted that Uthman was seized in Parachinar; that he reached the town after an eight-day trek from the Afghan town of Khost, nowhere near Tora Bora; and that his journey to Pakistan began around Dec. 8, 2001. Those facts make it difficult to portray Uthman as a fighter in a battle that took place between Dec. 12 and Dec. 17 at Tora Bora. Two footnotes in the original opinion note that the government does not contest that Uthman was taken into custody in Parachinar.
Both were removed in the second opinion and Kennedy substituted wording to write instead that Uthman admitted he was seized “in late 2001 in the general vicinity of Tora Bora, Afghanistan.”
The intent of this editing may have been to conceal the role of the Pakistanis in capturing al-Qaida fighters although those details were long ago declassified. But the effect was to link Uthman more closely to the retreat of bin Laden and his inner circle through Tora Bora.
It is unclear precisely what restrictions or classification requests guided Kennedy’s alterations. Neither the judge nor the Justice Department would say.
Gillers said such editing has an effect on public opinion, even when it doesn’t change the outcome of the case.
There are two competing interests in government redacting: protecting national security and protecting the prosecution. Not surprisingly, both of these institutional interests are alleged:
Officials at other agencies said they had a fairly free hand in removing information supplied for the government’s case. “Whenever a court security officer identifies a document slated for posting on the court’s public docket as potentially containing classified information, the officer refers that document to appropriate agencies for classification review,” Maj. Tanya Bradsher, a spokeswoman for the Pentagon, said.
One government official who spoke on the condition of anonymity acknowledged that the classification process has been plagued with inconsistencies and that no one is coordinating the effort. In most declassified habeas filings, the names of all detainee-witnesses are removed; in others, a name or two slips past the redaction process.
Some government-ordered deletions clearly appear designed to conceal names of confidential informants, associations with foreign intelligence services and the identities of certain federal agents. But the Uthman case shows that many of the deletions go further.
“This censorship has nothing to do with protecting ‘national security’ and everything to do with covering up government mistakes and malfeasance,” said Jonathan Hafetz, a professor at Seton Hall University School of Law who has represented a number of detainees in habeas litigation. The practice, he said, allows the government to “mislead the American public on issues of profound importance to the country by skewing the perception of who really is at Guantánamo.”
The question is not if both of these interests exist; even if one or both did not, there would at least be a perception of both. The question is how to address them. And the only way to do that is from outside the executive: Congress, the Supreme Court, or ideally both somehow would act in a way to ensure fair procedural safeguards.
The problem is that both institutions have essentially abdicated any responsibilities related to war whatsoever. This has long been the case with the Supreme Court. The laissez-faire attitude peaked in the Korematsu decision that refused to condemn the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two. The series of detainment decisions culminating in Boumediene were meaningful but the impacts, as we have seen, have been basically to give far outside limits. And the Congressional action, from the AUMF on, has been absolutely shameful.
My main problem is that for some reason people expect the executive to change this unilaterally. That will never happen. There are four reasons why this won’t happen:
1) No executive is going to be able to completely rid bureaucrats of a desire to protect prosecutors.
2) No president will unilaterally get prosecutors to be more forthcoming on issues of national security, especially when pushing for trust of the national security apparatus is the first thing any new President must do (particularly those with a history of perceived antipathy).
3) Add to this the overwhelming pressure to protect America. No President wants to release the guy who ends up creating the next 9/11 or Cole bombing. Voters would punish that proportionally far more than they would reward a President for releasing someone who the president thinks may just be a mild risk.
4) Presidential leadership on Guantanamo is not the most important variable in change. I thought Jamelle Bouie’s post on this was on the mark:
Yes, Guantanamo closure was a core issue for President Obama, and yes, it was a core issue for his liberal supporters, but it wasn’t a core issue for the Democratic Party, and it needed to be for any chance at success. Given unanimous and vocal Republican opposition to the administration agenda writ large, Guantanamo closure was virtually certain to become a bitter partisan fight. For success, Obama needed a certain level of pro-closure consensus among congressional Democrats. Absent that consensus (and combined with public pressure to the contrary), it was no real surprise to see the White House avoid confrontation: Given limited resources, limited power, and the choice between a hard fight with a small chance of success, and a hard fight with a moderate one, the administration felt best served by investing its resources in the hard fight with moderate chance of success, i.e., health-care reform.
In other words, like Bill Clinton and gays in the military, Guantanamo closure was a high-profile fight that lacked strong support within and outside the party. Obama could have invested further resources in closing the base, but he would have lost ground with health-care reform, stimulus, and other competing priorities. This isn’t to minimize Obama’s failures or the extent to which he has simply embraced large elements of Bush national-security policy, but you can think of an issue like Guantanamo as the price of presidential ambition. When there are many things on the executive plate, some of them have to go by the wayside. This, unfortunately, was one of them.
You can add to this that every electable politician on Guantanamo had the same position as Obama or was much further right (see Romney offering to double Guantanamo). This is why it frustrates me that so many on the left expend all pressure on the matter at Obama, and not on Congress, who is actually 1) pliable and 2) can be changed without massive collateral damage elsewhere.
Obama signed an executive order to close Guantanamo. What happened? The Senate foreclosed any such action by a 90-6 vote. That’s right. Ninety to six.
Until and unless Congress is pushed to engage more on detainee action, the executive will be on an island alone; the Supreme Court will determine the boundaries of that island but little more.
**Edited this post to make clear that the Pro Publica report was -not- politicized.
As I sat down for the night, I put C-SPAN on to find a panel from the Center for American Progress earlier today celebrating the 40th anniversary of OSHA. A quick Google news search showed that the only people covering this anniversary were, in fact, CAP itself and the AFL-CIO who had a representative on the panel. It did not even merit a press release from the Department of Labor! There is a OSHA at 40 page… located at the OSHA website. Most of what I’ve found here I found through twitter, not surprisingly.
So what is OSHA? It’s the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, signed into existence by the safest President of them all, Richard Nixon.
Basically, what OSHA does is ensure a safe workplace for everyone. I found these rebuttals of common complaints about OHSA salient. Here’s an excerpt:
3. Speaking of PPE, we never had that junk when I was in the field, and we did just fine.Did I just hear, “We’ve always done it that way?” Or maybe it was, “Real men don’t need that crap.” Think about this: Prior to 1970, there were about half as many workers in the United States as there are today, and there were 14,300 job-related deaths. Today, with a workforce more than twice as large, fewer than 5,000 workers are killed on the job in a year. Comparing relative rates (1970 vs 2008) there are about 82 percent fewer fatalities now than in 1970. That sounds pretty good, unless you consider that 5,214 workers were given capital punishment for the crime of going to work. Doesn’t sound so good, does it? Maybe the good old days weren’t so good.
4. OSHA writes citations that cost me money. How am I supposed to stay in business?Short answer: Maybe you shouldn’t be in business if you can’t protect your workers.
I’d really recommend the entire (short) article.
One last point: amidst all the talk about collective bargaining regarding wages (which is really important) collective bargaining also serves an important function in regards to safety standards. Unions are a major institution advocating for the safety of workers. Without their power and ability to mobilize, literally 6 or 7 thousand people a year would probably be dead because of their line of work.
Moreover, cutting OSHA is a dumb idea. It’s already underfunded. This is something the left should (and is) fighting for. There’s no business where it makes sense over any period of time to take serious safety risks in return for higher profit margins. None. OSHA is something that literally pays for itself, and is fundamental to what America is as a country: not letting people die on the job when simple inspections could prevent it.
We’ve seen attacks on OSHA before. The result? They’re nonsense:
OSHA has been particularly effective when regulating some of our most dangerous industries, which hasn’t stopped the affected employers from vigorously challenging the agency at every turn. Following a series of explosions in grain elevators in December 1977, which caused the deaths of 59 workers, OSHA began the process of developing a grain handling facilities standard that took a decade to put into effect. At the time industry was bitterly opposed. Yet, the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA), a persistent critic of OSHA, acknowledged in 1998 that the industry had seen “an unprecedented decline in explosions, injuries and fatalities at grain handling facilities.” In 2006, a review by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board reported a 42 percent decline in grain explosions, 60 percent decline in injuries, and a 70 percent decline in fatal accidents. (There are still recalcitrant employers who do not follow OSHA’s guidelines, leading to tragedies like the deaths of Pacas and Whitebread.) Similarly, the passage of the Cotton Dust standard in 1978 lowered rates of “brown lung” among textile workers throughout the country from approximately 12 percent to about 1 percent of all employees.
Despite these successes, business lobby groups and their allies in Congress have hamstrung OSHA’s effectiveness by thwarting tougher standards, restricting its budget, and limiting the number of inspectors. Today, state and federal OSHA agencies combined only have 2, 218 inspectors, and in every state the number of OSHA inspectors fails to meet the benchmark set by the International Labour Organization for the appropriate ratio of safety inspectors to employees.
This year’s headline catching accidents at Upper Big Branch and Deepwater Horizon, and many of the less known tragedies like the deaths of two teenagers in Mount Carroll, were avoidable with stronger laws and more vigorous enforcement. Industry groups have used their significant resources to escape their responsibilities. Now, the US Chamber of Commerce and congressional Republicans are stepping up their attacks on OSHA, recycling many of the same arguments they used 40 years ago. While they claim stronger workplace protections are “job killers,” the unfortunate reality is that it is American workers who are dying every day.
This is what the administrative state does: it slowly but inevitably makes society work better through a responsive, though slow, process. OHSA is just one example of that.
Sadly, that seems the road the right wants to take us on: where John Galt gives some crumbs, and if people die chasing them off a cliff, so be it. The moral repugnance of that cannot be overstated.
Via Matt Yglesias, stunning news from North America’s frigid third:
Jack Layton is riding high after a pair of polls show the NDP overtaking the Bloc Québécois – a change that would mark a huge transformation of the political landscape if it carried through to election day and was transformed into seats in the House of Commons.
A CROP survey published Thursday in the Montreal newspaper La Presse suggests the NDP is the preferred choice for 36 per cent of Quebeckers, compared to 31 per cent for the Bloc. The Tories were at 17 per cent in that poll and the Liberals were at 13 per cent.
And an EKOS Research surveyconducted for the internet news outlet iPolitics suggests that the New Democrats have jumped 10 percentage points since just before last weeks’ leaders debates to 31.1 per cent while the Bloc has dropped to 23.7 per cent.
Meanwhile, a Nanos Research pollconducted for The Globe and Mail suggests that Mr. Layton’s New Democrats are closing in on the Liberals for second place in popular support across the country.
It wasn’t inevitable that this was going to happen now, but this was inevitable sooner or later. The Bloc is in essence a vanity party: a vote for them and secession means that you as a voter literally do not care about any other issue, just secession. And given the past 5 years globally, as well as continuous effects of a conservative governing coalition, at some point it was bound to happen that people would vote their economic and social interests over a pure protest vote.
As I noted in my previous, lengthy post, Quebec at one point was the heart of the left in Canada. These polls indicate it might be happening again. The NDP is really center left (the liberals are left) but this literally could change everything: if the Bloc loses, then the NDP could have a governing coalition like the left used to.
What makes this really interesting, of course, is that it was the Bloc siding against Harper’s government in a no confidence vote that made this election possible.