Posts Tagged ‘President’
When Kennedy, who serves on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, ruled in February that Uthman was being improperly detained, his 27-page opinion was turned over to a court security officer for classification review.
The judges themselves have very little insight into the process and no sway over what is redacted. Government security officials review filings in the habeas litigation and other cases involving classified evidence and remove sensitive information.
In the Uthman case, that clearance process took three weeks. Kennedy’s decision was stamped “Redacted,” by the court’s security officer and returned to his chambers on March 16. The deletions were minimal. For the first 16 pages, the only word blacked out was “secret,” stamped at the top and bottom of each page.
Kennedy’s clerk added the document to the electronic court file late in the day. Twenty-five hours later, the security office sent out urgent notices to attorneys and the judge that the opinion had not been ready for release and needed additional deletions. The decision was promptly removed from the public docket.
In a closed hearing in his courtroom four days later, Kennedy lashed out at the government for releasing classified information. He and Justice Department attorneys then argued over what to do, according to three sources familiar with the discussion.
Kennedy insisted that the reasoning behind his first habeas ruling be made public. But the Justice Department resisted releasing it in redacted form, arguing that blacked out portions would call attention to the exact material the government wanted to conceal.
This is an excellent report by Pro Publica (not a surprise, they’re the best around at that). But beyond what Pro Publica reports, we as a society can often be in a rush to make everything a political decision, but sometimes it’s just as simple as a bureaucratic error. While the detention involved presidential decisions, the redaction decisions are of a much lower pay grade. One of them got screwed up, with no easy way to make it right. Regardless of whether detention at Guantanamo or elsewhere was done correctly, poorly, or somewhere in the middle, this situation could still exist.
It’s also hard to jump to conclusions about the impact on the judge when the judge will not say what it was:
Kennedy’s original opinion noted that Uthman was seized in Parachinar; that he reached the town after an eight-day trek from the Afghan town of Khost, nowhere near Tora Bora; and that his journey to Pakistan began around Dec. 8, 2001. Those facts make it difficult to portray Uthman as a fighter in a battle that took place between Dec. 12 and Dec. 17 at Tora Bora. Two footnotes in the original opinion note that the government does not contest that Uthman was taken into custody in Parachinar.
Both were removed in the second opinion and Kennedy substituted wording to write instead that Uthman admitted he was seized “in late 2001 in the general vicinity of Tora Bora, Afghanistan.”
The intent of this editing may have been to conceal the role of the Pakistanis in capturing al-Qaida fighters although those details were long ago declassified. But the effect was to link Uthman more closely to the retreat of bin Laden and his inner circle through Tora Bora.
It is unclear precisely what restrictions or classification requests guided Kennedy’s alterations. Neither the judge nor the Justice Department would say.
Gillers said such editing has an effect on public opinion, even when it doesn’t change the outcome of the case.
There are two competing interests in government redacting: protecting national security and protecting the prosecution. Not surprisingly, both of these institutional interests are alleged:
Officials at other agencies said they had a fairly free hand in removing information supplied for the government’s case. “Whenever a court security officer identifies a document slated for posting on the court’s public docket as potentially containing classified information, the officer refers that document to appropriate agencies for classification review,” Maj. Tanya Bradsher, a spokeswoman for the Pentagon, said.
One government official who spoke on the condition of anonymity acknowledged that the classification process has been plagued with inconsistencies and that no one is coordinating the effort. In most declassified habeas filings, the names of all detainee-witnesses are removed; in others, a name or two slips past the redaction process.
Some government-ordered deletions clearly appear designed to conceal names of confidential informants, associations with foreign intelligence services and the identities of certain federal agents. But the Uthman case shows that many of the deletions go further.
“This censorship has nothing to do with protecting ‘national security’ and everything to do with covering up government mistakes and malfeasance,” said Jonathan Hafetz, a professor at Seton Hall University School of Law who has represented a number of detainees in habeas litigation. The practice, he said, allows the government to “mislead the American public on issues of profound importance to the country by skewing the perception of who really is at Guantánamo.”
The question is not if both of these interests exist; even if one or both did not, there would at least be a perception of both. The question is how to address them. And the only way to do that is from outside the executive: Congress, the Supreme Court, or ideally both somehow would act in a way to ensure fair procedural safeguards.
The problem is that both institutions have essentially abdicated any responsibilities related to war whatsoever. This has long been the case with the Supreme Court. The laissez-faire attitude peaked in the Korematsu decision that refused to condemn the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War Two. The series of detainment decisions culminating in Boumediene were meaningful but the impacts, as we have seen, have been basically to give far outside limits. And the Congressional action, from the AUMF on, has been absolutely shameful.
My main problem is that for some reason people expect the executive to change this unilaterally. That will never happen. There are four reasons why this won’t happen:
1) No executive is going to be able to completely rid bureaucrats of a desire to protect prosecutors.
2) No president will unilaterally get prosecutors to be more forthcoming on issues of national security, especially when pushing for trust of the national security apparatus is the first thing any new President must do (particularly those with a history of perceived antipathy).
3) Add to this the overwhelming pressure to protect America. No President wants to release the guy who ends up creating the next 9/11 or Cole bombing. Voters would punish that proportionally far more than they would reward a President for releasing someone who the president thinks may just be a mild risk.
4) Presidential leadership on Guantanamo is not the most important variable in change. I thought Jamelle Bouie’s post on this was on the mark:
Yes, Guantanamo closure was a core issue for President Obama, and yes, it was a core issue for his liberal supporters, but it wasn’t a core issue for the Democratic Party, and it needed to be for any chance at success. Given unanimous and vocal Republican opposition to the administration agenda writ large, Guantanamo closure was virtually certain to become a bitter partisan fight. For success, Obama needed a certain level of pro-closure consensus among congressional Democrats. Absent that consensus (and combined with public pressure to the contrary), it was no real surprise to see the White House avoid confrontation: Given limited resources, limited power, and the choice between a hard fight with a small chance of success, and a hard fight with a moderate one, the administration felt best served by investing its resources in the hard fight with moderate chance of success, i.e., health-care reform.
In other words, like Bill Clinton and gays in the military, Guantanamo closure was a high-profile fight that lacked strong support within and outside the party. Obama could have invested further resources in closing the base, but he would have lost ground with health-care reform, stimulus, and other competing priorities. This isn’t to minimize Obama’s failures or the extent to which he has simply embraced large elements of Bush national-security policy, but you can think of an issue like Guantanamo as the price of presidential ambition. When there are many things on the executive plate, some of them have to go by the wayside. This, unfortunately, was one of them.
You can add to this that every electable politician on Guantanamo had the same position as Obama or was much further right (see Romney offering to double Guantanamo). This is why it frustrates me that so many on the left expend all pressure on the matter at Obama, and not on Congress, who is actually 1) pliable and 2) can be changed without massive collateral damage elsewhere.
Obama signed an executive order to close Guantanamo. What happened? The Senate foreclosed any such action by a 90-6 vote. That’s right. Ninety to six.
Until and unless Congress is pushed to engage more on detainee action, the executive will be on an island alone; the Supreme Court will determine the boundaries of that island but little more.
**Edited this post to make clear that the Pro Publica report was -not- politicized.
Greg Sargant quotes Obama en route to drawing a silly conclusion:
Rather, the more important part of Obama’s 2007 quote is this one:
“In instances of self-defense, the President would be within his constitutional authority to act before advising Congress or seeking its consent. History has shown us time and again, however, that military action is most successful when it is authorized and supported by the Legislative branch. It is always preferable to have the informed consent of Congress prior to any military action.”
Putting aside the legal questions here, Obama is acting in violation of the lessons he once took from history. Along these lines, Dem Rep. John Larson of Connecticut, who added his voice to the criticism of Obama’s decision, made an important point today. Larson noted that even if Obama technically is in compliance with the War Powers Resolution, he is violating its spirit: “To insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”
Obama very well may have had his reasons for not consulting Congress as extensively as he might have — time was of the essence; the president expects this to be wrapped up quickly; he doesn’t envision this as a full-scale war; etc. But it’s very obvious that Obama’s approach is at odds with his own instincts and his own reading of history, at least as it stood when he was the reader and other presidents were the lead actors.
I would certainly say that the current debate (outside of this post) proves that it’s better to have the informed consent of Congress too! Obama is getting pilloried for his actions, and he’s not receiving the bump Presidents normally do from using military action.
But saying that it makes Obama “in violation of the lessons he once took from history” is over the top and incorrect. It implies a Manichean view of history – either you follow the best possible procedure or you are in violation. That’s an incorrect method of appraising Presidential action. Using an extreme example, Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War without prior Congressional authorization in a way that was almost certainly unconstitutional. But facts on the ground demanded it, Congress later ratified it, and in the end historians have almost universally hailed the move. Now, this is far less serious a situation than that. But there’s a lot of precedence to Presidents being forced to take actions that might be objectively bad, but are necessary given the circumstances. There’s even precedence for it going too far (the Steel Seizure case). In short, Obama didn’t violate a lesson of history. He took an action that he felt was the best course of action but was in an ideal world sub-optimal.
He simply felt the costs of getting authorization subsequently (while real) were more palatable to him than the costs of waiting – which Sargant makes an informed guess at.
This is just a continuation of people who want to make some sort of philosophical or legal point against the intervention in Libya because they don’t know enough of the facts on the ground to criticize it on the merits. And that is a result of a stunning lack of transparency coming from the White House. The easiest way to stop these sorts of silly arguments would be for reputed major proponents such as Amb. Rice, Sec. Clinton, and Samantha Power to do rounds on talk shows instead of the the military. I’ve seen them all on talk shows previously, they communicate well. Get them out there!
On a side note, Larson’s comment of the spirit of the War Powers Resolution is hogwash: It was passed over a veto in the wake of a President lying the Congress into war and every President since has felt it partially unconstitutional. And as a matter of practice since it was passed, Congress has not always had prior consent to actions. I don’t think what’s even legal in the law itself is clear, much less that there’s uncontested “spirit” which just so happens to contradict the plain text that gives a President 60 days.)
Eugene Volokh thinks it is too early for a campaign to repeal the 22nd Amendment:
I have no informed opinion on the subject of term limits for Presidents, and can see good arguments in either direction. Perhaps the voters should be entitled to choose Obama for a third time in 2016 (if of course they choose him a second time in 2012). Or perhaps the political power of an incumbent President can be made so great, especially if the incumbent knows that he may legally be reelected indefinitely, that the people will in reality have more choice if term limits are imposed.
But I am pretty sure that it’s a bit early to get the public excited about “making Obama’s third term possible,” though maybe that’s the slogan that’s needed to get donations from the base. And more broadly, it seems to me that this is the sort of amendment that — like the Twenty-Second Amendment itself — should be drafted not to apply to the person who is in office when the amendment is proposed. Both as a matter of policy and politics, any such change should be focused on the principle, and not on allowing the reelection of any particular person.
I agree with all of that.
On a practical matter, amending the Constitution requires two thirds of both houses and legislative approval by 75% of states. Obama may be a political dynamo right now, but he doesn’t have near the type of support to make that happen. There’s a reason why, most of the time, amendments based upon the political power of one person fail in this country – most don’t have that power.
On an additional level, I don’t think nowadays – with the near constant scrutiny and short political lives, that anyone could physically pr politically be President for three full terms. Even before the financial crisis, Republicans were running away from Bush. Clinton was an anchor tied to Gore in 2000. Now, partisans on both sides might take issue, but that’s the point: only partisans feel that way.
The 22nd Amendment may not have been intended for these reasons – it may have been intended for the reasons Volokh mentions. But in practice, it reflects political norms and becomes a convenient excuse. And circumstances should drastically change and a time should happen where we need to eliminate it, we should weigh all these factors then – even if the change would apply the man in office. Hopefully we’ll have the foresight and vision to do so in a sober manner.